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A B S T R AC T  | The paper discusses the similarities and differences between neo-developmentalism and 
neo-extractivism. The evaluation compares Brazil with nine other Latin American countries and is based on a 
framework that considers both economic policies and their outcomes. On the policy side, it looks at income, 
monetary, international trade, industrial and mineral resource policies; on the outcome side, it observes the 
composition of both exports and the Gross Domestic Product. In the end, we argue that neo-developmentalism 
and neo-extractivism are actually variations of the same development route and may face similar challenges 
in the long term.
K E Y WO R D S  | Neo-developmentalism, neo-extractivism, development, Latin America.
Neodesarrolismo al revés: un análisis del actual modelo brasileño de desarrollo
R E S U M E N  | El artículo analiza las similitudes y diferencias entre el neodesarrollismo y el neoextractivismo. 
Esta revisión compara Brasil con otros nueve países de América Latina y utiliza como base un modelo que 
considera las políticas económicas y sus resultados. Por el lado de la política, considera la política económica, 
industrial, de comercio internacional, ingresos y recursos minerales. Por el lado de los resultados, observa la 
composición de las exportaciones y el PIB. Por último, se argumenta que el neodesarrollismo y neoextracti-
vismo en realidad son variaciones de la misma vía de desarrollo y tienden a enfrentar los mismos desafíos en 
el largo plazo.
PA L A B R A S  C L AV E  | Neodesarrollismo, neoextractivismo, desarrollo, América Latina.
Neodesenvolvimento ao contrário: uma análise do atual modelo brasileiro de desenvolvimento
R E S U M O  | Este artigo analisa as semelhanças e as diferenças entre o neodesenvolvimentismo e o neoextrati-
vismo. Esta revisão compara o Brasil com outros nove países da América Latina e utiliza como base um modelo 
que considera as políticas econômicas e seus resultados. No que se refere à política, considera as políticas de 
renda, monetária, de comércio internacional, industrial e de recursos minerais. Quanto aos resultados, observa 
a composição das exportações e o PIB. Por último, argumenta-se que o neodesenvolvimentismo e o neoextrati-
vismo em realidade são variações da mesma via de desenvolvimento e tendem a enfrentar os mesmos desafios 
em longo prazo.
PA L AV R A S - C H AV E  | Neodesenvolvimentismo, neoextrativismo, desenvolvimento, América Latina.
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Introduction
Neo-developmentalism and neo-extractivism are two 
economic discourses that have developed indepen-
dently in Brazil and in Spanish America respectively; 
the paper discusses the extent to which neo-develop-
mentalism coincides with the neo-extractivist route. 
Although these paths have differences, they also 
share important assumptions and policy strategies. 
Moreover, Brazil has partially implemented proposed 
neo-developmentalist policies, and their outcomes have 
brought its economy even closer to neo-extractivism. 
Therefore, the paper argues, as a theoretical contri-
bution, that both discourses are variations of the same 
development route and may face similar challenges in 
the long term.
The neo-extractivism concept was originally proposed 
by Eduardo Gudynas (2009; 2012a, 2012b) and later 
advanced by various other authors. It is a version of the 
classic extractivism characterized by: “(1) the important 
role played by transnational corporations in the 
exploitation of raw materials and in the appropriation 
of profits; and (2) the fact that the state was tasked 
with preserving this model internally” (Burchardt and 
Dietz 2014, 469-470). Most of the literature on neo-ex-
tractivism adopts a critical perspective, denouncing 
economic risks, negative social effects, and harmful 
environmental impacts. We follow the same line of 
argument, focusing on the economic aspects.
In spite of the important contributions of previous 
works, many failed to include a proper analysis of 
the Brazilian case. Some authors have deliberately 
restricted their analysis to Andean countries 
(Bebbington 2009; Bebbington and Bebbington 2010), 
while others have mentioned Brazil as just another 
Latin American country (Svampa 2013; Macdonald and 
Ruckert 2009; Veltmeyer 2013).
In order to overcome this limitation, we bring together 
the concepts of neo-extractivism and neo-develop-
mentalism. The latter was initially proposed by Luiz 
Carlos Bresser-Pereira (2004; 2008; 2012) as a national 
development strategy that represented an alternative 
to classic developmentalism and neoliberalism in Brazil. 
Its formulation was intended to describe an alleged 
inflection in economic policies since the early 2000s, 
but it also prescribed lines of action to strengthen 
an industrial, export-led route of development, built 
around the exchange rate (Bresser-Pereira 2012). The 
framework was endorsed and enriched by authors who 
focused on its structural, economic and social impacts 
(Sicsú, Paula and Michel 2007; Bastos 2012). However, 
criticism of neo-developmentalism highlighted the 
ambiguities between policy prescription and practice, 
focusing on the enduring features of neoliberal policies 
and on monetary policy (Almeida 2012; Gonçalves 2012; 
Sampaio Jr. 2012).
Different studies have drawn attention to contradictory 
policies and outcomes, supporting the idea of a 
hybrid profile of Brazilian economic policy (Morais 
and Saad-Filho 2011), providing a framework to grasp 
the relations between social and economic policies 
within development strategies in Latin America 
(Draibe and Riesco 2011), discussing the implications 
of neo-developmentalism for regional integration 
(Lamoso 2012), and analyzing other empirical routes, 
such as the Argentinian one (Cunha and Ferrari 2009).
Except for these sparse contributions, however 
important they may be, major views on neo-devel-
opmentalism have been mainly restricted either to a 
normative standpoint, much to the detriment of its 
descriptive dimension, or to the Brazilian case alone, and 
thus unable to establish the necessary links between 
Latin American economic routes. By approaching 
neo-developmentalist and neo-extractivist discourses 
in Latin America within a largely descriptive, analytical 
framework centered on Brazil, we aim to advance a 
more comprehensive view of the design and outcomes 
of economic policies.
We argue that, although Brazil presents some neo-ex-
tractive characteristics common to other Latin 
American countries, it also has specific elements that 
require deeper analysis. We follow a line of argument 
close to the one proposed by Yates and Bakker (2014), 
but looking at only two types of post-neoliberal 
regimes: neo-extractivism and neo-developmentalism. 
Methodologically, our work is also close to that of 
Singh (2013), and we have organized detailed infor-
mation about the countries evaluated. Nevertheless, 
we are less optimistic in assessing Brazilian success in 
promoting resource-led economic development.
We have structured the paper in six sections. After 
this introduction and the methodology section that 
follows it, we trace the lines that distinguish and 
relate neo-developmentalist and neo-extractivist 
discourses. In the fourth section, we propose a model 
for analyzing the economic policy associated with 
neo-developmentalist discourse in Brazil, within the 
parameters of the equivalent initiatives in selected 
Latin American countries. This approach aims at 
coupling both the prescriptive and the descriptive 
dimensions of neo-developmentalist discourse and at 
highlighting its main limitations. Section 5 deepens the 
idea that current economic discourses in Latin America 
are structurally similar. In the case of Brazil, we have 
argued that a “topsy-turvy neo-developmentalism” has 
emerged which reinforces neo-extractivist aspects of 
the national economy. Attempts are made to explain 
this process, highlighting the path dependency 
related to neoliberal institutions, political groups and 
conflicts, the inconsistency of the various policies, and 
the structural limits imposed by the global economy. 
Finally, we present the main conclusions.
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Methodology
We have developed the paper based on a comparative 
perspective, evaluating Brazilian policies and perfor-
mance within the Latin American context. Latin America 
is defined based on the criteria proposed by Oro and Ureta 
(2007). Among these countries, we selected the ten that 
have the greatest share of non-renewable resource rents 
(oil, gas, coal and mining) in the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), and the largest economies, measured by GDP, as 
presented in Table 1. There are great differences among 
economic structures within this group, and we take such 
variations into account throughout the analyses.
The discussion is based on empirical data that charac-
terize the countries’ economic policies and their 
respective outcomes. On the economic policy side, the 
research evaluates income (minimum wage and cash 
transfer programs), monetary (interest rate), inter-
national trade (exchange rate), industrial, and mineral 
resource policies. Due to limitations in the scope of this 
article, other aspects of economic policy such as fiscal 
policy, government budget and commercial policy, are 
not discussed here. From the outcome perspective, we 
consider both the composition of exports and the GDP 
structure. The framework is summarized in Image 1.
Conceptual aspects
On economic discourses
We define neo-developmentalism and neo-extractivism 
as economic discourses (Diaz-Bone 2013; Jessop 2010a), 
supporting an epistemological attitude based on both the 
cultural and social embeddedness of economies. On the 

















Note: Non-renewable resources include oil, gas, coal, and 
mining.
Source: World Bank (2013).
one hand, we agree with the Cultural Political Economy 
emphasis on the role of meaning systems in reducing 
complexity in economic life (Jessop 2010a, 337). On the 
other hand, we follow the New Economic Sociology 
approach in recognizing the political dimension and 
performative capabilities of all economic phenomena 
(Diaz-Bone 2013). By adopting such an attitude, we 
also reinforce a diachronic and comparative approach 
to understanding relations between liberal, develop-
mental, neoliberal, and post-neoliberal conceptions.
According to the linguistic definition, discourse is 
language in action, i.e., the operation of a system of 
collective representation and expression. As a set of 
structured, shared understandings, a discourse shapes 
not only the margins of thinking about, but also of 
acting on social life (Humphreys 2009).
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Based on this constructivist socio-economic perspective 
(Diaz-Bone 2013), economic discourses legitimize certain 
forms of action, to the detriment of other alternatives. 
On the one hand, they constitute “prescriptive” concep-
tions about the relationship between economy, politics 
and society, “providing a normative programme for how 
society and politics should be organized” (Humphreys 
2009, 319). On the other hand, as economic lexicon in 
action, they are also descriptive (Humphreys 2009, 319), 
expressing conflict processes and producing actual 
consequences in those domains, i.e., being “causally 
efficacious” (Jessop 2010a, 337).
General characteristics
In this section, we point out the main aspects of neo-de-
velopmentalism and neo-extractivism. We compare 
their perspectives, mention some strategies, and 
confront differences.
Neo-developmentalism
The literature in Brazil has described neo-developmen-
talism as a multifaceted phenomenon, emphasizing its 
economic, ideological, political, and social dimensions. 
In general, two main branches have been identified: one 
supportive and the other critical.
Authors that “promote” the notion (Bresser-Pereira 
2004, 2008, 2012; Sicsú, Paula and Michel 2007) share 
a prescriptive view, conceiving it either as a “national 
strategy for development” (Bresser-Pereira 2008, 73) or 
as an “alternative program to the neo-liberal project” 
(Sicsú, Paula and Michel 2007, 508). They assume that 
neo-developmentalism means an essential break with 
the neoliberal discourse and a selective return, in a 
different global economic context, to economic coordi-
nation patterns inspired by developmentalism.
On the other hand, the critical literature (Almeida 
2012; Gonçalves 2012; Sampaio Jr. 2012) disputes the 
intended break, defining neo-developmentalism as 
some kind of rooted liberalism or as a liberal-mercan-
tilist commitment.
Nevertheless, we argue that both perspectives have been 
restricted to the prescriptive dimension, either advancing 
its normative program or focusing on the enduring features 
that hold together neoliberalism and neo-developmen-
talism. Despite being closer to some claims advanced by 
the critical approach (Almeida 2012), we attempt to add to it 
a descriptive, analytical framework to assess neo-develop-
mentalism. This paper thus aims to present an empirically 
sustained criticism of neo-developmentalism.
Before doing that, however, it is important to represent 
the normative storyline that pervades neo-develop-
mentalist discourse.
Firstly, its justifying claim of breaking with neolib-
eralism is grounded on the incorporation of a 
redistributive drive, albeit restricted. Secondly, the 
developmental role of the state (Evans 2004) is refor-
mulated as complementary to that of the private 
sector, so that the domains of economic policy are 
defined as tools for overcoming “market failures” 
(Bresser-Pereira 2008, 56).
Along its projective axis, neo-developmentalist discourse 
represents itself as being industrialist, grounded on a 
disjunction between the financial and industrial forms 
of capital, and taking a stand in favor of the latter’s 
dominance as the mainstay of economic growth.
Neo-developmentalist discourse is also based on an 
export-led growth strategy,1 putting the exchange 
rate “at the center of the development theory” (Bress-
er-Pereira 2012). The very notion of the “industrial 
equilibrium exchange rate” (Bresser-Pereira 2012) 
discloses projective content in the face of the Dutch 
disease,2 i.e., regular currency overvaluation driven 
by resource rents and its negative impacts on private 
investment in the exporting branch of industry.
Finally, the neo-developmentalist discourse also 
retrieves a narrative about the formation of the nation in 
conditions of structural inequality. Thus, the definition of 
nation as an interclass compromise assumes particular 
prominence (Bresser-Pereira 2008, 70).
Neo-extractivism
The neo-extractivist discourse has been produced from 
an analytical and critical perspective, and its normative 
component tends to assume the form of a debate on 
alternative development, embracing initiatives such as 
the post-extractivist strategies proposed by some Latin 
American researchers and institutions (Acosta 2000; 
GPTAD 2011; Gudynas 2012c; Svampa 2012).
Gudynas (2009; 2012a) defines neo-extractivism as 
a development model focused on economic growth 
and based on natural resources, short production 
networks, and subordinate international insertion. 
In this model, the state has an active role, seeking its 
legitimacy through the appropriation and redistri-
1 Despite its recent focus on international trade, the Brazilian 
economy is still mostly dependent on its internal market. 
However, between 1995 and 2009 the share of domestic 
consumption in the GDP decreased from 83% to 79% while the 
importance of exports increased from 7% to 14% (IBGE 2011).
2 While Bresser-Pereira (2012) highlights international trade 
relations as a key driver of currency overvaluation and 
prescribes an exchange rate capable of supporting indus-
trial exports, we agree with Salama (2012, 246) that “national 
currency appreciation cannot be ascribed [entirely] to 
the economy ‘primarization,’” seeing capital inflows and 
monetary policy as more important drivers.
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bution of natural resource rents. Furthermore, it has 
been associated with self-proclaimed progressive 
governments (Gudynas 2012a, 130).
The idea of neo-extractivism defines a set of strategies 
anchored in a group of economic sectors that remove 
a large volume of natural resources and export them 
with very little or no processing (Acosta 2011; Gudynas 
2012a, 2012b).
For Acosta (2011), the existence of natural wealth and 
the recurrent economic crises in Latin America have 
consolidated a rentier mentality, as well as patrimonial 
and patronage practices in politics and society. Along 
these lines, the relationship between natural-re-
source endowment and economic outcomes has also 
been addressed within the resource curse framework, 
comprising phenomena such as deterioration of 
terms of trade, high volatility in the prices of natural 
resources, feeble economic diversification, and the 
Dutch disease (Acosta 2011; Davis and Tilton 2005; 
Sapsford and Balasubramanyam 1994).
Nonetheless, the neo-extractivist discourse is charac-
terized as a combination of some traditional and 
innovative elements. To summarize its main features, 
Gudynas (2009; 2012a) argues that neo-extractivism 
is a contemporary version of developmentalism and 
therefore presents economic growth as a way of 
overcoming social inequality —and that, in its recent 
guise, it identifies with the funding of social programs. 
In addition, the state no longer has the exclusive 
function of maintaining the rules that ensure the 
functioning of production processes, but it does have a 
leading role in extractive activities.
Perhaps the main aspect that differentiates the two 
discourses is in the importance given to natural resources. 
Within the neo-extractivist perspective, the immediate 
use of natural resources is strategic for speeding up 
economic growth. In this discourse, extractive activities 
are seen as “creating wealth” and as being important 
elements for generating jobs and distributing income to 
vulnerable groups (Gudynas 2012a).
In this sense, the progressive governments in Latin 
America do not question the role of extractive indus-
tries in the pursuit of national development. On the 
contrary, they construct new arguments to justify its 
adoption. Firstly, perhaps the most commonly used 
argument is that extractive activities are of “national 
interest” or “public utility” (Albavera 2004). A second 
argument claims that Latin American countries have 
enormous wealth that “must” be used, and must not be 
“wasted” (Gudynas 2012b).
The implementation of neo-extractivist strategies 
has been intensified in recent years, especially at a 
time when commodities obtained high prices in the 
international market due to the demand from Asian 
countries, especially China (Cacciamali, Bobik and Celli 
Jr. 2012; Bebbington 2009). This “positive” economic 
result has thus reinforced the discourse in various 
Latin American countries.
Origins
We propose describing the origins of neo-developmen-
talism and neo-extractivism as a strategy to identify 
some of their common aspects. They both originated 
in countries that have gone through developmentalist 
and neoliberal periods, and we argue that they both 
conserve some elements of previous discourses.
The neo-developmentalist and the neo-extractivist 
matrices can be established as post-neoliberal 
discourses (Arsel and Angel 2012; Bebbington and 
Bebbington 2010). They emerged as both evolu-
tionary and reactive forms associated with the 
neoliberal discourse that was dominant in Latin 
America between the mid-1980’s and early years of 
the new millennium (Arditi 2008; Yates and Bakker 
2014). As proposed by Kaltwasser (2011, 228), “the 
term postneoliberalism refers to the emergence of 
a new historical moment that puts into question the 
technocratic consensus on how to achieve economic 
growth and deepen democracy.”
Despite the results obtained during the 1950s and 1960s, 
the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy 
seemed somewhat outworn throughout the 1970s, with 
growing external debt and trade deficit. The ISI model 
became untenable since higher international interest 
rates marked the end of the period following the new 
restrictive monetary policy in the United States (Mattei 
and Santos Júnior 2009). The dependency link between 
national and global economies was brought to mind by a 
serious financial crisis in the 1980s that drove economic 
strategies and structures towards paying the debt and 
depressed growth rates throughout the period.
This process resulted in a strong reaction against the 
existing model and induced a neoliberal pull starting in 
the 1990s (Barton 2006). Brazil, like most Latin American 
countries, went through a process of reduction in the 
size of the state, privatization of public enterprises, 
trade liberalization, and inflow of transnational capital.
During this period, the focus on the domestic market 
was reduced, so that the export drive was updated as the 
“new” development strategy (Barton 2006). However, 
the international insertion process was marked by 
low competitiveness of regional industrial products, 
which led countries to rely once more on exporting 
resource-intensive products that still had comparative 
advantages. For example, there was a large increase in 
the regional share of the international mining industry, 
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and by the late 1990s Latin America represented more 
than 25% of the world’s production of bauxite, 45% of 
copper, and 29% of tin (U.S. Geological Survey 2012).
The period thus saw the region re-specializing in 
resource-intensive products, which allowed the entry 
of foreign currency needed to import technology-in-
tensive goods (Schaper and Vérèz 2001).
There were important changes in the region in the first 
decade of the new millennium. Governments coming 
into power identified themselves as progressive, thus 
characterizing the period —albeit problematically— as 
post-neoliberal (Yates and Bakker 2014). Among the 
regional leaders were Hugo Chávez (Venezuela, 1998), 
Ricardo Lagos (Chile, 2000), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
(Brazil, 2003), Nestor Kirchner (2003), Evo Morales 
(Bolivia, 2005), Tabaré Vázquez (Uruguay, 2005), 
Rafael Correa (Ecuador, 2006), and Fernando Lugo 
(Paraguay, 2008). There were also varying degrees of 
disruption; while some aspects of neoliberal discourse 
were maintained, others were revised in what would 
later be labelled neo-developmentalism in Brazil and 
neo-extractivism in other countries of Latin America 
(Gudynas 2009; 2012a).3
Based on this analysis, we have argued that post-neo-
liberal discourses are not a complete innovation, but 
rather a combination of features historically rooted in 
the economic and political landscape of Latin America. 
In spite of some new elements, these discourses are 
largely constructed by appropriating and renewing 
elements and assumptions that are reminiscent of past 
periods.
Common assumptions
Neo-developmetanlism and neo-extractivism share 
some assumptions that influence their strategies. In 
this section, we look at three aspects considered crucial 
in their development: belief in growth, international 
insertion, and partnership between state and market.
Belief in growth
In general, both neo-developmentalism and neo-ex-
tractivism are aligned around growth as a means of 
promoting development, either as prediction or as justi-
fication of national political and economic structures. 
3 Despite the links between redistributive policies led by 
leftist and center-left governments in Latin America, and 
development strategies anchored on natural goods (Bridge 
2004 139), we define neo-extractivism broadly, from two 
perspectives: the centrality of exploring for natural goods 
and the leading role of the state —also driven by right-wing 
and center-right governments, as in Colombia, Guatemala, 
Mexico, and Peru. Nevertheless, the idea of redistribution 
still has analytical relevance.
Moreover, despite their differences, they share beliefs 
with regard to notions of progress as unlimited growth 
(Altvater 2002) and to the promotion of social welfare. 
In this sense, one of the main measures to promote 
growth is the increase of domestic consumption 
spurred by income policies.
The tradition of economic growth has been a 
permanent feature of Latin American economic 
discourses; nevertheless, this maintenance should not 
be assumed as something natural. More than forty 
years after the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, various proposals have been 
made to overcome this perspective. Although such 
studies are found both in Anglo-Saxon (Hamilton 
2003, Jackson 2009) and in Latin American literature 
on the subject (GPTAD 2011; Gudynas 2012c), advocates 
of neo-developmentalism and neo-extractivism seem 
oblivious to this consideration. In spite of the impor-
tance of such literature, the debate that criticizes the 
imperative of permanent and increasing economic 
growth lies beyond the scope of this text.
International insertion
A second similarity between neo-developmentalist and 
neo-extractivist policies is related to growth through 
increasing participation in international trade.
Bresser-Pereira (2012) indicates that in neo-develop-
mentalism industrialization should be export-oriented 
and combined with increased internal consumption; 
alternatively, Morais and Saad-Filho (2011) claim that 
this discourse replaces the emphasis on the domestic 
market with a greater focus on international trade. 
Moreover, international trade would be a way to ensure 
the transfer of technology as a strategy capable of 
making peripheral countries competitive in the global 
market (Sicsú, Paula and Michel 2007). Thus, neo-de-
velopmentalism, like developmentalism, would be a 
strategy of industrial catch-up (Oreiro 2012, 29).
Gudynas (2009) indicates that neo-extractivist govern-
ments also value exports, especially since this strategy 
ensured the survival of their economies during 
the financial crisis of 2008. However, international 
insertion would not only be increased by exports, 
but also from a broader view of globalization which 
includes increasing the flow of financial capital and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). An important step in 
this direction is the provision, either by the state or 
by public-private partnerships, of infrastructure that 
facilitates supplying the international market. In the 
Latin American context in general, great importance 
is given to the Initiative for the Integration of the 
Regional Infrastructure of South America (Armijo 2013), 
while one may also mention the Growth Acceleration 
Program in the specific case of Brazil.
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Partnership between state and market
Perhaps the main rupture that post-neoliberal 
discourses represent relates to the role played by the 
state. On the one hand, the state takes over some of 
the tasks set by the ISI model and, on the other hand, 
it receives new responsibilities due to the influence of 
neoliberal assumptions.
According to neo-developmentalist authors, the devel-
opment process occurs mainly through partnerships 
between state and market. Thus, any institutional 
reform should aim at strengthening both state and 
market, with the former having an important role 
of creating investment conditions that allow for the 
growth of the latter (Bresser-Pereira 2012). In other 
words, the best development strategy would be one 
in which “a strong state stimulates the flowering of a 
strong market” (Sicsú, Paula and Michel 2007).
Similarly, it has been seen that governments with 
neo-extractivist ideals have also sought to strengthen 
the performance of private companies. In this new 
context, such governments liberalized and protected 
their own capitalist dynamics, abstaining from taking 
decisions that might jeopardize accumulation processes 
(Gudynas 2012a).
Empirical aspects
In order to evaluate similarities and differences 
between neo-developmentalism and neo-extractivism, 
we have compared a set of five economic policies and 
appraised two major outcomes in Brazil and nine other 
Latin American countries. The comparison is based on 
income (minimum wage and cash transfer programs), 
monetary (interest rate), international trade (exchange 
rate), industrial, and mineral resource policies. At 
the same time, we have evaluated the results of such 




One of the major strategies for accelerating growth 
in Brazil as well as in other Latin American countries 
has been by stimulating domestic consumption. Thus, 
the idea of a class alliance means an important review 
of distributive systems in both neo-extractivist and 
neo-developmentalist discourses. Although the distrib-
utive role of the state is also within the framework of 
fiscal policy (taxation), its most important tools in Latin 
America have been cash transfer programs and, in the 
case of Brazil, a real increase in the minimum wage 
(Hunter and Sugiyama 2009).
Cash transfer programs have been adopted in various 
countries in the region, for example, in Argentina 
(Programa Familias), Bolivia (Bono Juancito Pinto), Brazil 
(Programa Bolsa Família), Chile (Chile Solidario), Colombia 
(Familias en Acción), Ecuador (Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano), Guatemala (Mi Familia Progresa), Mexico 
(Oportunidades), and Peru (Juntos, 2005) (Johannsen, 
Tejerina and Glassman 2009).4 They characterize what 
Gudynas (2012a; 2012b) calls the “compensating state,” 
which deploys anti-poverty strategies based on the 
distribution of fiscal resources. In some cases, e.g., Bolivia, 
these are directly linked to the capture of extractive 
income. According to Gudynas (2012a; 2012b), this is 
one of the main differences between neo-extractivist 
governments and classic rentier ones in which revenues 
were captured exclusively by local elites.
More importantly, Chart 1 indicates that Argentina, 
Brazil, and Ecuador were the countries that invested 
the most in enhancing their minimum wage.5 In 
Brazil, different wage policies have marked the 
transition between neoliberal and neo-developmen-
talist discourses. Accordingly, between 1994 and 2002, 
workers’ purchasing power decreased by 9.3%. In turn, 
the rise in nominal wages between 2003 and 2012 
represented an increase of 44.9% in the real minimum 
wage. Therefore, wage policy under neo-developmen-
talism has meant a positive inflection on the historical 
path of national income appropriation.
Brazil has thus partially adopted the practices of 
countries with extractivist profiles. On the one hand, 
cash transfer programs bring Brazil closer to these 
countries. On the other hand, Brazil’s commitment to 
the growth of formal employment and optimization 
of the minimum wage have excelled in comparison to 
other countries, which would seem to strengthen a 
practice closer to neo-developmentalism.
Monetary policy
Two of the key aspects of the Brazilian development model 
of development are the emphasis on and continuation 
of monetary policy. Renewing accumulation conditions 
in the Brazilian economy involves monetary policy and, 
above all, the interest rate, to the detriment of trade 
policy and the exchange rate, as proposed by Bresser-
Pereira (2012). Overall, the interest rate represents the 
price of money, rewarding some agents for abstaining 
from spending in the present, but regulating the future 
behavior of other agents towards risk-taking related to 
profit opportunities and, as a result, towards investment.
4 In Venezuela, although there were some cash transfer 
initiatives in the mid-1990s, they were replaced by the 
“Misiones Bolivarianas” in the early 2000s (Melo 2012).
5 The considerable wage gains in Argentina are explained by 
the low relative values practiced in the early 2000s, after 
the economic crisis.
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Chart 1. Variation of real minimum wage
Source: Cepal (2013).
The performance of the Brazilian interest rate under 
neoliberal and neo-developmentalist policies is indic-
ative of a fracture in the conception of monetary policy, 
but one that is not deep enough to support an indus-
trial upsurge. Neoliberal advocates view interest rates 
as the key device for controlling inflation. As such, 
the Federal Securities Market (SELIC) rate6 displayed a 
brusque behavior between 1996 and 1999 (rising from 
19.1% to 45.7% in October 1997; from 25.5% to 40.2% in 
September 1998; and hitting 45.0% in March 1999), thus 
echoing the confrontation of currency devaluation 
crises in Asia (1997), Russia (1998), and Brazil (1999). In 
turn, the interest rate and target converge from June 
1999 onwards, bouncing around about 20%, but surging 
again after the presidential elections in 2002.
Under the terms of neo-developmentalist discourse, 
softer fluctuations characterize the SELIC rate. While 
starting from 25.4% in January 2003, most of the period 
was characterized by downward oscillation. Although 
the SELIC reached its lowest levels, slightly above 7.0%, 
in 2012, a small inflationary rise (6.7% in 12 months) 
moved it upwards once more, to 7.9% in July 2013.
A decrease in interest rates is not a consensual 
goal among economic agents. Although it means an 
6 The basic interest rate is calculated annually as the average of 
daily operations in the SELIC, pegged to federal government 
bonds, grounded on a resale/repurchase agreement. The 
SELIC rate works as a benchmark for market interest rates 
with its target set by the Monetary Policy Committee.
important stimulus for exports, such “private sector’s 
exporting developmentalism” (Bastos 2012, 787) clashes 
with the key roles of financial capital and public debt in 
conditioning state action.
Therefore, despite a notable decrease, the SELIC rate 
remains high compared to profit rates in industry, 
hence preventing the redirection of domestic savings 
to the industrial sector, which would otherwise serve 
as a continuous and significant stimulus to industrial 
investment. As a result, the export drive could only be 
effective in industries with comparative advantages, 
with mining being emblematic of them.
Chart 2 shows the comparative extent to which interest 
rates in Latin American countries passed through 
similar and convergent processes of decline in the first 
five years of the new millennium, followed by stability 
or growth in the second five years. Although Brazil has 
historically stood out for the highest rates among the 
countries analyzed —being surpassed only recently by 
Argentina— monetary policy throughout Latin America 
remains unconducive to industrial development.
International trade policy
The exchange rate sets the relative price of currency 
and serves as an important international trade policy 
tool. It illustrates key connections between economic 
and political interests, influencing demand for domestic 
production through specific ways of linking national 
and foreign markets (Frieden and Stein 2001).
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Chart 2. Monetary policy rate
Note 1: The monetary policy rate is defined as the interest rate that the central bank of each country uses as an instrument 
of monetary policy. No data were available for Ecuador.
Source: CEPAL (2013).
In the 1990s, several Latin American countries such as 
Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru adopted a pattern of 
stability of currency convertibility to the US Dollar,7 
while others presented significant processes of currency 
appreciation, with Argentina and Venezuela at the 
forefront. Nonetheless, following the aforementioned 
foreign exchange crises, by the late 1990s most exchange 
rates in Latin America underwent a devaluation 
movement, with Argentina and Brazil being the most 
striking cases, while Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela 
were the atypical ones.
Nevertheless, the Brazilian exchange rate, as well as 
those of other nations, returned to previous currency 
levels between 2003 and 2012. At first, such a path 
brings international trade policies in neoliberal and 
neo-developmentalist/neo-extractivist discourses closer 
together. Despite this fact, the theoretical debate on 
international trade policy and the exchange rate (Souza and 
Carvalho 2011; Marconi and Rocha 2012), and its key role 
in neo-developmentalist discourse (Bresser-Pereira 2012; 
Salama 2012) highlights a chronic issue of overvaluation.
7 The analysis is related to the “adherence move to more 
pegged exchange rate regimes, as an important tool to 
fight inflation,” which Canuto and Holland (2001, 95) claim 
has been characteristic of Latin America throughout the 
1990s. For simplifying purposes, the year 1990 is taken as 
a reference point for the overvaluation of exchange rate 
regimes in Latin America.
Souza and Carvalho (2011, 568) have argued that a new 
phase of convertibility and capital account liberal-
ization began in 2002 so that “the exchange rate became 
more and more a price determined by the market,” 
thus influencing Brazil’s economic structure as well 
as its trade relations. Accordingly, Marconi and Rocha 
(2012, 880) relate overvaluation to mutually reinforcing 
trends: from investment stagnation in manufacturing, 
through a declining share of manufactured goods in 
exports along with decreasing profitability, to higher 
production costs in manufacturing. Therefore, the 
authors admit, “the inhibiting effect of currency appre-
ciation on aggregate demand and manufacturing seems 
to prevail over its [potential] stimulating one” in Brazil.
Such trends converge towards reducing both the 
heterogeneous and endogenous nature of the economic 
structure. Although limited in comparison to other 
Latin American countries, Brazil’s exchange rate 
overvaluation has prompted the expansion of the 
commodity-exporting sector, which benefits from 
the “Ricardian rent that allows realizing a high profit 
margin and absorbing the exchange appreciation 
without reducing income yield below a still adequate 
level” (Marconi and Rocha 2012, 882).
Concerns with the exchange rate are also due to the 
requirement of financing the development strategy 
on the basis of current account deficit, through loans, 
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negative chain reaction it produces —from monetary 
and wage appreciation to reduced opportunities for 
profitable investment (Bresser-Pereira 2012, 14-16). 
Salama (2012, 246) goes further in stating that currency 
appreciation in Brazil “is explained mostly by the 
substantial volume of capital inflows attracted by a 
rather sharp differential in interest rates.”
However compelling, the argument of chronic 
overvaluation of the exchange rate in Brazil since the 
late 1990s lacks empirical evidence. The exchange rate 
of the Brazilian Real is the second lowest among Latin 
American countries, ranking only below that of the 
Argentinian peso. This establishes a threshold limit 
in similarities between the neo-developmentalist and 
neo-extractivist discourses. In fact, Brazil has adopted 
a dirty floating exchange rate regime through the 
Central Bank’s interventions in the currency market. 
More important, though, is the vital linkage between 
the exchange rate and interest rates. We assume that 
the ad hoc adjustment of the exchange rate in Brazil 
is related to the greater importance given to interest 
rates and to the preservation of capital influx, a 
factor already noticed but not considered of central 
importance by some analysts (Bresser-Pereira 2012, 
Salama 2012). This fine-tuning makes the interna-
tional trade policy dependent on monetary policy and 
allows greater scope for the international insertion 
of specific branches of industry, typically primary and 
low-tech industries.
Industrial policy
The debate on industrialization and natural resources is 
possibly the most jarring one among neo-developmen-
talist and neo-extractivist discourses. In neo-develop-
mentalism, manufactured and technology-intensive 
goods are key devices within the industrial strategy 
inspired by the experience of East Asia’s Newly Indus-
trialized Countries (Sicsú, Paula and Michel 2007). 
Accordingly, the discourse upholds industrial policies 
that aim at increasing the competitiveness of the 
nation’s industrial firms (Morais and Saad-Filho 2011).
Notwithstanding, Bresser-Pereira (2012, 521) defines 
industrial policy as strategic rather than central in neo-de-
velopmentalism. In this context, only companies that are 
“efficient enough for exporting will be benefited by the 
industrial policy” so that the state aims at optimizing 
their resources and the economic structure is driven 
by “sectors where Brazil would have greater capacity 
or need to develop competitive advantages” (Cano and 
Silva 2010, 6-7). In Brazil, however, those companies that 
are “efficient enough” are also resource-intensive, thus 
leading down to path dependency.
In a comparative study, Peres (2006) identified the 
fact that most Latin American countries have adopted 
policies directed towards only a few sectors, usually 
extractive ones. In contrast, Brazil’s policies tend to be 
broader and horizontal, thus reaching far more sectors, 
but also reinforcing established (resource-based) 
sectors rather than inducing the emergence of new 
technology-intensive ones.
If Brazilian industrial policy on the one hand differs to a 
large extent from a neo-extractivist profile, limitations 
of design and implementation on the other hand prevent 
it from consolidating a thoroughly neo-developmentalist 
drive. Firstly, the country’s industrial policies are 
characterized by governance limitation: they depend on 
several different government agencies and bodies that are 
not necessarily aligned, thus creating a certain “decision-
making cacophony” (Schapiro 2013) and reducing the 
chances of success. Secondly, there is a generally low 
strategic capacity (Jänicke 1992); government sectors 
are not only incapable of maintaining long-term plans, 
but also lack the strength needed to define a consistent 
number of target sectors.
While some of these limitations are structural, system-
atically defining the forms and functions of capitalist 
states, we understand the state to be a social relation, 
based on a strategic-relational approach (Jessop 
2010b). Accordingly, Brazilian economic policies since 
the beginning of the new millennium have been an 
exemplary case of precarious balancing of forces. Indus-
trial policies have been driven by diverse “power centers 
and capacities” with contradictory economic interests as 
well as by state-actors that have progressively under-
mined an “overall strategic line” (Jessop 2010b, 45). A 
brief evaluation of the conflicts involving the country’s 
main industrial programs illustrates this point.
Formulation of the Industrial, Technological and 
International Trade Policy (PITCE) in 2003 was the first test 
for neo-developmentalism. The Brazilian state aimed at 
rebuilding institutional structures for nurturing not only 
the sectors “of the future” (such as renewable energies, 
bio- and nano-technology), but also the “strategic” ones 
related to the export-led growth strategy —like capital 
goods, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and software 
(MDIC 2003). PITCE meant an estimated US$17.2billion 
written off as tax exemption between 2003 and 2006 
(Cano and Silva 2010).
There was a scattering of institutional initiatives in the 
years that followed, in spite of scarcer resources. The 
PITCE was replaced by the Productive Development 
Policy (PDP) in 2008, which involved a tax waiver of US 
$9.2 billion (Cano and Silva 2010). The PDP was drafted 
in response to a business backlash against the PITCE 
because of its narrow scope (Schapiro 2013) and meant 
a horizontal revival of seven leading sectors (i.e., meat, 
pulp/paper, mining and oil/gas/petrochemicals), eleven 
competitive ones (e.g., agribusiness, leather/shoes/
leather goods and wood/furniture), and a few strategic 
ones (e.g., nuclear energy) (MDIC 2008).
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Three years later, the Greater Brazil Plan 2011-2014 
(PBM) kept the links between industrial, technological 
and trade policies, and classified the economic sectors 
into agribusiness, production, scale- and labor-in-
tensive systems, and even included a new service policy 
(i.e., trade/personal services, logistics and productive 
services) (MDIC 2011). The PBM was also horizontal 
in nature (Peres 2011) and 51% of its operations were 
intended for any branch of industry, while only 15% 
were driven towards technology-intensive sectors 
(Schapiro 2013).
The inconsistency in Brazil’s industrial policy can be 
identified not only in its explicit strategy, but in the 
implicit one as well. For example, there is a significant 
unbalance in Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) 
support for resource-intensive sectors. During the period 
between 2002 and 2012, the participation of the oil and 
gas, mining, and energy sectors jumped from 54% to 75% 
of the portfolio of BNDES Participações S.A. (BNDESPar);8 
and if the statistics include the paper and pulp and the 
food (particularly animal protein) sectors, this share rises 
to 89% (Torres and Góes 2013).
Mineral resource policy
While industrial development strategies are closely 
related to neo-developmentalist discourse, mineral 
resource policies tend to be an important linkage to the 
neo-extractivist one.
Modification in the legislation on mineral resources 
generally dates back to the 1990s, when many Latin 
American countries altered their national regulatory 
regimes in order to attract large companies by insti-
tutionalizing their property rights (Chaparro 2002). 
However, later changes aimed at either guaranteeing 
or increasing the state’s share in capturing extractive 
rent (Viale and Cruzado 2012).
In the Brazilian case, the proposal of a new Mining 
Code had as its objectives the intensification of mining 
activity, increasing government control over mineral 
exploitation, and greater participation of the state in 
capturing mineral rents.
The bill was intended to change the scheme for awarding 
concessions, which would be obtained either through 
bidding (to ensure that research and mining rights are 
given to companies with real operating capacity) or 
by permission, to the detriment of the “priority right” 
(according to which the first party to request access 
obtains the right). In addition, it proposed replacing the 
Department of Mineral Production with the National 
Mining Agency, whose directors would be appointed 
8 BNDESPar is a wholly-owned subsidiary of BNDES, and 
manages the latter’s shareholding in public and private 
companies.
by the Presidency. Moreover, it was to create the 
National Mineral Policy Council, the composition of 
which would also be defined by the Federal Executive. 
Finally, the bill would also increase royalty rates, and 
change the basis for calculating them so as to increase 
the amount paid to the state (Congresso Nacional 2013; 
MME 2009, 2010b, 2010a).
The mineral bill proposed in Brazil was highly consistent 
with neo-extractivist perspectives and assumptions 
(Milanez and Santos 2013). Overall, it would bring the 
country more closely in line with other Latin American 
countries with respect to the extractive sector.
Economic outcomes
In addition to the political aspect, empirical studies 
indicate that recent trends in Latin American 
economies are related to the growing importance of 
highly competitive, export-led, resource-intensive 
economic sectors. As a general diagnosis, Chinese-led 
trade and industrial ties have reassembled global 
asymmetries and national development strategies, thus 
inducing an overall transition to the “Consensus of the 
Commodities” (Svampa 2012) and giving rise to relative, 
premature deindustrialization in Brazil (Jilberto and 
Hogenboom 2010; Salama 2012).
This scenario differs largely from that proposed by 
neo-developmentalist discourse. Thus, in this section, 
we evaluate the extent to which the increasing partic-
ipation of primary commodities (re-primarization) in 
Brazilian exports and GDP would reinforce a neo-ex-
tractivist profile.
In this sense, there is strong evidence that the prescriptive 
facet of neo-developmentalism, explicit in the proposed 
“adoption of a growth system of the export-led type, 
in which promoting exports of manufactured products 
induces the acceleration of capital accumulation [...]” 
(Oreiro 2012, 29), is contradicted by the regressive 
specialization of trade patterns. Therefore, this strategy 
needs further qualification and requires an assessment 
regarding the extent to which neo-extractivist “trends” 
can be identified in Brazil’s international insertion and in 
its economic structure.
In general, these trends were first identified in the 
early years of the new millennium by Gonçalves (2001, 
13), who defined the process of regressive insertion 
as involving “both the significant loss of interna-
tional competitiveness of Brazilian industry, and the 
phenomenon of the re-primarization of exports.” 
According to this author, Brazilian exports went 
through a phase of technological upgrading throughout 
the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, only to have 
such behavior reversed later on. At that time, the 
process was explained as mainly a result of the change 
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in the export structure, represented by the increased 
relative importance of agricultural products.
Similarly, De Negri and Alvarenga (2011) pointed out the 
significant expansion of the primary commodity share 
in exports during recent years. According to MDIC 
data (2014), the contribution of non-industrial goods 
in Brazilian exports grew from 16% to 38% between 
1996 and 2013, and a similar increase was also noted in 
other Latin American countries (Unctad 2012). Further 
evaluation of the behavior of commodity exports also 
demonstrates the important role played by the mineral 
sector. For example, the mining industry accounted for 
almost 15% of Brazilian exports in 2013 (MDIC 2013).
This process does not seem to be restricted to interna-
tional trade and it affects the importance of the indus-
trial sector in the GDP. Thus, while the building industry 
and public services (electricity, gas, water, sewage and 
waste management) maintained a stable participation in 
the GDP between 2000 and 2011, there was a significant 
rise in the share of mining (1.6% to 4.1%). Not coinci-
dentally, the participation of manufacturing decreased 
from 17.2% to 14.6% (IBGE 2014). Similarly, with respect 
to the participation of mineral rents in the GDP of ten 
Latin American countries, Brazil appeared in third place 
at the beginning of the new millennium and stabilized 
more recently in fourth place, as shown in Chart 3.
Discussion
Throughout this paper we have attempted to assess key 
policies related to neo-developmentalism in Brazil and 
neo-extractivism in other Latin American countries. 
The result of this comparative analysis is summarized 
in Image 2. Accordingly, it can be seen that the two 
discourses have certain premises in common, such 
as their belief in growth, international insertion, and 
partnership between state and market. Nonetheless, in 
spite of these similarities, they should not be confused 
since they also have significant differences such as 
the neo-developmentalist belief in technological 
innovation, the concern with industrialization, the 
relevance of domestic consumption, and the role of 
formal employment.
Empirical evaluation indicates that Brazil and its 
neighbors have implemented analogous policies 
that have generated similar results. From a compar-
ative perspective, three of the five Brazilian policies 
analyzed here are similar to those adopted in countries 
with extractivist profiles, with the result that even 
though Brazil’s GDP has a hybrid profile (with low, but 
increasing participation of primary sectors), Brazilian 
exports in contrast are typically extractivist in nature.
It can be argued that the countries selected have 
developed disconnected initiatives aimed at expanding 
both their domestic consumption and their share in 
international trade. Thus, income policies that focus 
on raising the minimum wage or on cash transfer 
programs have increased consumption, mainly of final 
goods. However, monetary (interest rates) and inter-
national trade policies, and unsuccessful industrial 
policies in the case of Brazil, have not favored local 
industry, a situation which has resulted in increased 
imports of technology-intensive products, thereby 
increasing the pressure on trade balances. At the same 
time, effective mineral resource policies have emerged 
Chart 3. Evolution of mineral rents in Latin America
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Image 2. The profile of Brazil’s current development model
Source: The authors.
as a short-term strategy for increasing state revenue 
and balancing national accounts. As a result, one can 
identify a process of re-primarization both of exports 
and economic structure in Brazil.
Thus, the empirical data point to a “topsy-turvy neo-de-
velopmentalist” process in Brazil, suggesting that 
policies directed towards the implementation of this 
model (strengthening the state, creating infrastructure, 
stimulating exports) produce neo-extractivist conse-
quences. Although the phenomenon requires further 
study, in this section we delineate and describe three 
primary explanations for it: (1) the maintenance of a 
core of neoliberal resistance in government decision-
making centers, (2) the inconsistency of industrial 
policies, and (3) the exaltation of endogenous capacities 
to restructure the industrial matrix, along with a denial 
of the limitations imposed by the global economy.
First of all, neo-developmentalism has been trying to 
transform a governmental bureaucracy that has been 
under the control of political-economic groups defending 
neoliberal measures for seventeen years, many of which 
still influence major decisions. Within this context, the 
presence of a neoliberal resistance core in key institu-
tions such as the Central Bank and important areas like 
monetary policy, can be a factor that neutralizes the actual 
implementation of neo-developmentalist proposals.
In this sense, one could argue that neo-developmentalism 
has been used as a tool for interest groups associated with 
neoliberalism within the government. Such groups would 
allow neo-developmentalist initiatives to be adopted 
to the extent that they consolidate the export-oriented 
sectors, while other areas, sometimes dearer to the heart 
of neo-developmentalist strategists, would not develop. 
In other words, sectors with comparative advantages 
(such as extractive activities) that facilitate the early entry 
of foreign currency would be strengthened, thereby 
ensuring the payment of interest on public debt. The main 
way to control this selective developmentalism would be by 
managing exchange and interest rates. It could therefore 
be argued that the social paths for the formulation and 
implementation of previous development strategies are 
deeply resilient and have a great influence on later devel-
opment initiatives.
A second explanation for the non-consolidation of 
neo-developmentalist policies would be the inconsis-
tency in defining a consensual rationale and the priority 
sectors of the national industrial policy. From 2003 to 
2011, Brazil constructed three programs for guiding its 
industrial policy, all of which differed in both their logic 
and their priorities. This constant change of focus could 
at least partially explain the difficulty of establishing a 
group of sectors to benefit from support for industrial 
policies for a sufficiently long period of time.
Since many of the “strategic” sectors are based on 
the extraction of natural resources, partial and inter-
mittent support tends to strengthen the existing nodes 
of these networks, but does not provide opportunity 
for the establishment of technology-intensive activ-
ities, since these require long-term stimuli to arise and 
become consolidated.
The low capacity for planning and implementation 
among governmental sectors geared towards industrial 
competitiveness also becomes evident when compared 
with the mineral sector. Since there is no executive 
agency to implement policies in support of industry, 
such policies are endlessly redefined, as in the case of 
the new mineral bill which was designed by a selected 
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dential Chief of Staff and the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy over a period of three years (Milanez 2012).
Thirdly, the normative perspective of neo-develop-
mentalism apparently ignores the structural limita-
tions imposed by the world’s current economic 
context. Considering the hegemonic role of China and 
other Asian countries as the major global suppliers of 
manufactured goods, the possibility of industrialization 
through traditional sectors, as defended by neo-devel-
opmentalist authors, may be considered unlikely.
Along these lines, Jilberto and Hogenboom (2010) mention 
that although both Brazil and China aim at increasing the 
added value of their economies, Brazil’s success has been 
quite limited in this regard. Oliveira (2010) and Salama 
(2012) both agree with this argument and point to the high 
degree of trade asymmetry between them; whilst China 
is Brazil’s main trade partner, the latter has only a negli-
gible share in China’s international trade. Moreover, such 
asymmetry is also based on the exchange of industrialized 
products for mineral and agricultural products.
The unprecedented demand resulting from the Chinese 
industrial revolution gave rise to a new setting in the 
world’s demand for commodities, which Brazil is in 
a unique position to explore due to its comparative 
advantages, strengthened by economic policy cycles 
based on different ideologies (Delgado 2010). In this sense, 
the above-mentioned intermittent neo-developmentalist 
policies, such as constituting logistic-productive 
infrastructures aimed at increasing exports and 
supporting the creation of new Brazilian transnational 
corporations, would tend to consolidate the country’s 
subordinate insertion. In the specific case of the mineral 
extraction industry, the increasing exports of ores is due 
mostly to the China effect, with that country’s economic 
growth being identified as the main cause of the rise 
in commodity prices (Prates 2007). The impact of this 
growth on Brazilian exports was verified by Bastos and 
Gomes (2011) who estimated that the combined structural 
effect of iron ore exports from Brazil to China increased 
by 1,491% between 1997/1999 and 2007/2009.
We therefore argue that neo-developmentalist discourse 
has not been able to produce the promised results. To 
the contrary, its economic policies seem to consolidate a 
neo-extractivist profile, understood as the primary form 
of expanding the participation of extractive industries in 
Brazil’s exports as well as in its economic structure.
Final remarks
Although Brazil cannot be defined as a neo-extractivist 
country, its neo-developmentalist policies have taken 
it along a re-primarization path. Furthermore, the 
similarities between the two discourses studied here 
suggest they are both variants of the same economic 
route. Based on this argument, three reflections can be 
made in reference to future research.
Firstly, there is a need for a better understanding of the 
long-term economic effects of the policies based on these 
discourses. The strengthening of an extractive profile can 
generate a series of economic challenges in the long term, 
since resource-dependent economies have shown either 
low or even negative growth rates (Davis and Tilton 2005; 
Sachs and Warner 1997). Accordingly, recent develop-
ments in economic outcomes in Latin American countries 
have supported the resource curse thesis (Acosta 2011; 
Davis and Tilton 2005; Sapsford and Balasubramanyam 
1994), among which negative trends in trade balances are 
shaping more orthodox policy responses. Understanding 
the extent to which these processes are already creating 
economic risks for Brazil and Latin America in general 
still requires further research.
Secondly, it also seems necessary to look beyond the 
economic outcomes of these discourses and include socio-
environmental aspects in future analyses. It is important 
to discuss the extent to which strategies based either 
on low-tech industries or on the extractive industry, 
differ in their non-economic impacts. The territorial 
embeddedness of mineral projects and heavy industries, 
for example, tends to reflect on the types and forms of 
conflict, since they project varying degrees of intensity 
with respect to the dispute for common and natural goods. 
Formulating typologies of development conflicts seems to 
be a stimulating path for understanding the possibilities 
and limits of economic discourses on development.
Finally, the debate about alternative routes to economic 
development is still open. In this sense, initiatives such 
as the transition to post-extractivism, which promotes 
more stringent regulations and leads to a model of indis-
pensable extraction (Acosta 2000; GPTAD 2011; Gudynas 
2012c), require further development and debate. Along 
these lines, it is necessary to reflect on how to integrate 
the debate on the conservation of natural resources, 
the preservation of cultural diversity, and the society-
nature relationship in development strategies.
In this sense, this paper advocates the need for civil society 
groups to engage strategically in framing the assumptions 
of economic discourses on development as wide-ranging 
public issues, in order to confront hegemonic views and 
expand democracy. Regardless of the focus of economic 
policies, the agency of affected groups and and/or interested 
parties must challenge the premises of unlimited growth and 
national interest. Accordingly, the evidence suggests that 
a virtuous socioeconomic transition requires broad social 
mobilization —which already exists in many cases— in order 
to ensure that the rules of the game are modified, which 
may arise from the accumulation of a series of local conflicts 
(Bebbington 2009). We believe that their politicization is the 
only way to produce essential breaks with the unsustainable 
path of the hegemonic economic discourses.
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